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Abstract
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are often used to promote renewable energy
and to foster substitution for fossil energy sources. In practice, the minimal level of
renewable energy to be supplied can be defined either as a ratio of the energy-mix
(proportional mandate) or as an independent quantitative target (quantity mandate).
The objective of this paper is to compare the consequences of the two types of quan-
titative mandates in terms of energy prices, support economic policies and carbon
emissions. We thus extend the Chakravorty et al. (2006) model by considering, in
addition to the carbon cap constraint, a RPS constraint (alternatively, a quantity or
a proportional mandate). Our main results are the following. Independently of any
carbon taxation, a quantity mandate requires a single subsidy on renewable energy
to be enforced whereas a proportional mandate is equivalent to a tax-subsidy scheme
that is revenue-neutral. Whatever its type, the mandate lowers the energy price and
the social objective function, and it delays the date at which the carbon cap constraint
is binding. If the two types of mandates are such that they yield the same social ob-
jective value then, the quantity mandate implies a lower energy price, a larger subsidy
on renewable energy and a smaller fossil fuel tax (including the carbon tax) than the
proportional mandate.
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1 Introduction
Including power generation, transport and industry, the energy sector accounts for 65%
of total greenhouse gases emissions in 2006 (Stern, 2007). More particularly, the largest
source of carbon emissions is due to electricity generation and heat, accounting for 41%
of emissions worldwide according to the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008). In
this context, substituting renewable energy sources for fossil energy sources has, at least,
two advantages. First, it relaxes the availability constraint on the fossil non-renewable
resource stocks. Second, since renewable energy sources are the most often carbon-free,
such a substitution constitutes a key technological option to reduce carbon emissions in
the energy sector and to satisfy some mitigation targets.1
The main break to a massive development of technologies based on renewable energy
sources is their cost as compared with traditional fossil fuels.2 Since they are more costly,
renewable energy sources currently represent only a small portion of the energy portfolio,
that is 19% including hydropower (IEA, 2008). However, as underlined by Popp et al.
(2011), while the costs of these technologies are higher than other fuels, they have also
been falling. On the one hand, competitiveness of renewable energies may grow since the
traditional fossil energies are expected to be more expensive in the future because of their
scarcity. On the other hand, the fall in their costs which is observed since the 1980s (in
particular for solar PV) is mainly due to a technical change effect, both through learning
processes and R&D activities. The gap between renewable and fossil energies is then
expected to be gradually reduced, but this will take time. Consequently, specific policies
to promote renewable energy technologies are needed to accelerate the energy transition
(Kalkhul et al., 2011).
Many renewable energy promoting policies take the form of quantitative mandates
or, equivalently of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). This regulation requires the
increased production of energy from renewable energy sources and aims at reaching some
given target by a pre-definite future date. Apart from its contribution to climate policy
(through lower carbon emissions per unit of energy), the main motive of RPS is the security
1Another mitigation option would consist in maintaining the fossil fuel consumption and reducing its
carbon print by using some abatement devices, such as CCS or air capture (see Lafforgue et al., 2008, or
Amigues et al., 2011).
2For wind and geothermal technologies, the extra-cost of generation is near $0.05/kWh in the most
favorable locations, and larger elsewhere. This extra-cost rises to $0.20-0.30/kWh for solar PV (IEA,
2006).
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of energy supply since it allows for decreasing the dependence on foreign fossil energy
deliveries (Boeters and Koornneef, 2011).
Technically, the type of obligation placed on the energy supplier can be twofold since
the associated mandate can be defined either in quantity or in proportion. In practice,
both types of mandates have been unclearly adopted. In United States, the 2005 Energy
Policy Act established a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) that mandates specific quantity
targets for biofuel use (36 billion gallons by 2022). For electricity, US Renewable Electricity
Standards (RES) policies are implemented at the federal level. Reviewing state-by-state
RES programs, it is clear that the norm is to differentiate support by technology type,
but without any harmonization about the type of mandates. Hence, the Michigan's target
is to produce 300MW of renewable electricity by 2013 and 600MW by 2015 whereas Col-
orado committed to reach 30% of renewable electricity by 2020 for instance. Even at the
international level, RPS are not harmonized. China adopted in 2009 a renewable energy
target aiming at producing 500GW of renewable electricity by 2020 (300 from hydro, 150
from wind, 30 from biomass and 20 from solar PV). In 2007, the EU Directive on Energy
Production from Renewable Sources committed itself to target of 20% of renewable energy
in the total EU energy consumption by 2020, and of 33% of renewable electricity.
Even if the quantitative objectives induced by quantity and proportional mandates can
seem to be equivalent, differences in their direct economic consequences, both in quantities
and prices, are not harmless. These two approaches contrast at least in two points. The first
difference concerns the definition and the implementation of the critical support economic
policies induced by each type of mandate. A quantity mandate requires a single instrument
to be enforced: a subsidy for renewable energy use (Vedenov and Wetzstein, 2008, Galinato
and Yoder, 2011).3 In contrast, a proportional mandate requires a combination of fossil
fuel taxes and renewable energy subsidies that are revenue neutral (Lapan and Moschini,
2011). This tax-subsidy scheme is equivalent to a feed-in-tariff: a tax on fossil energy
is used to cross-finance a subsidy on renewable energy and thus yields an income-neutral
policy for the government (Kalkhuhl et al. 2011). Taking into account these differences,
the energy consumer-price may vary according to the type of mandate.
The second difference lies in the dynamic properties on the induced energy-mix. Whereas
non-renewable and renewable energy uses are disconnected under a quantity mandate, they
are linked with under proportional device. In particular, if the proportional target is con-
3In the case of biofuels in the US, Vedenov andWetzstein (2008) remark that, historically, these subsidies
are funded from general tax funds, mostly from income and labor taxes, and not from fuel tax revenus.
3
stant over time, as long as renewable energy is still more expensive than the non-renewable
one, the energy producer will just supply the minimal amount of renewable required to
satisfy the mandate. This may lead to a situation where both primary energy consump-
tions are declining over time, the fossil energy because of the standard Hotelling scarcity
effect, and the renewable one because of its proportionality link with the fossil energy use.
The economic literature on RPS mentioned above is quite recent and analyzes sepa-
rately these two kinds of mandates, mainly through simulated models. To our knowledge,
there does not exist any comparative study of quantity and proportional mandates. Never-
theless, such a comparative analysis would be useful, in a policy harmonization objective,
to answer to some crucial questions such as: i) Which type of mandate is the cheaper for
the energy user? For the energy producer? For the social planner? What are their impacts
on the fossil fuel consumption path (and then on carbon emissions)? The objective of our
paper is to provide answers to these questions.
We use the Chakravorty et al. (2006) model to determine the optimal exploitation
time-paths of two primary energy sources that are perfect substitutes, a fossil energy
and a renewable one. These optimal paths are considered along with the two following
features. First, the cumulative atmospheric pollution stock is set not to exceed some
critical threshold. Second, the renewable energy use is constrained by a mandate which is
constant over time and defined ab-initio. This mandate can be defined either in quantity
or proportionally. We do not discuss about the normative properties of the carbon cap and
the RPS. We simply assumed that they are recommended by an independent expert and
that they must be taken as given by the agents. Then, the policy-maker must implement
a carbon tax to enforce the carbon bank constraint, and, alternatively, a single subsidy
on renewable energy use to enforce the quantity mandate, or a simultaneous tax-subsidy
scheme on the energy-mix to enforce the proportional mandate.
The main results of the paper are the following. i) Whatever the type of mandate,
the optimal subsidy on renewable energy is declining over time. ii) Under a proportional
mandate, an additional penalty on fossil energy, proportional to the subsidy, must be added
to the carbon tax. The resulting global tax on fossil fuel, which combines this penalty with
the traditional carbon tax, can exhibit unusual non-monotonous time paces as long as the
atmospheric carbon cap is not reached. iii) Whatever the type of mandate, a RPS lowers
the energy price, reduces the social objective function and delays the date at which the
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carbon cap constraint is binding. iv) If the two types of mandates are such that they yield
the same social objective value then, with an inelastic energy demand function and as long
as the carbon cap is not reached, a quantity mandate implies a lower energy price, a larger
subsidy on renewable energy and a smaller fossil fuel tax (including the carbon tax) than
a proportional mandate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and lays down the social
planner program under each type of mandate. In section 3, we derive the optimal solution
under the quantity mandate. In particular, we characterize the content and the time pace
of the optimal energy-mix, the energy price trajectory and the policy-mix allowing to
sustain this optimal path. The case of a proportional mandate is examined in section 4.
In section 5, we develop a comparative analysis of the two types of mandates in the case
where the energy demand function is inelastic. Finally, we briefly conclude in section 6.
2 Model and notations
We consider a stationary economy in which the final consumption good is a bundle of energy
services, which can be produced from two primary natural resources: A carbon-emitting
non-renewable resource, oil, and a carbon-free renewable resource, solar.
Fossil resource
Let us denote by X0 the initial oil endowment of the economy, by X(t) the remaining part
of this endowment at time t, and by x(t) the instantaneous consumption flow of oil, so
that:
X˙(t) = −x(t), with X(0) = X0, X(t) ≥ 0 (1)
x(t) ≥ 0 (2)
The average delivery cost of oil cx is assumed to be constant and, absent any sunk
cost, equal to the marginal cost. This cost includes the extraction cost of the resource,
the cost of industrial processing (crude oil refining) and the transportation cost. To keep
matter as simple as possible, we also assume that no oil is lost during the delivery process.
Equivalently, the oil stock X(t) may be understood as measured in ready-for-use units.
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Carbon emissions and atmospheric carbon stock
Let Z(t) be the stock of carbon within the atmosphere at time t, and Z0 be the initial stock.
The atmospheric carbon stock is fed by carbon emission flows resulting from oil burning.
We denote by ζ the quantity of carbon by unit of oil which is released into the atmosphere
after combustion. The atmospheric carbon stock is assumed to be self-regenerating at some
constant proportional rate α, α > 0, so that the dynamics of Z(t) results into:
Z˙(t) = ζx(t)− αZ(t), with Z(0) = Z0 ≥ 0 (3)
We assume that a carbon cap policy is prescribed to prevent any catastrophic damages
which would be infinitely costly for the society. This policy consists in forcing the at-
mospheric carbon stock to not overshoot some critical level Z¯, Z¯ > Z0, resulting in the
following constraint upon the state variable Z(t):
Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 (4)
To satisfy the constraint when the atmospheric carbon stock reaches its critical level, the oil
consumption x(t) must be at most equal to x¯ = αZ¯/ζ, the oil consumption rate generating
an emission flow that is balanced by natural regeneration.
Carbon-free renewable resource
The alternative energy source is supplied by the carbon-free renewable resource, the solar
energy. Let y(t) be the solar energy instantaneous consumption rate and cy its average
delivery cost. Because cx and cy both include all the costs necessary to deliver ready-for-use
energy services to the potential users, both resources may be seen as perfect substitutes
for the users, so that we may define the instantaneous aggregate energy consumption rate
as q(t) = x(t) + y(t), provided that the costs cx and cy are incurred.
The average cost cy is assumed to be constant and higher than cx. We also assume
that the natural flow of available solar energy, denoted by yn, is large enough so that no
rent has ever to be imputed for its use. Denoting by y˜ the solar energy consumption rate
it would be optimal to consume at the marginal cost cy, we thus assume y
n > y˜.
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)
The renewable energy promoting policy takes the form of a RPS and we alternatively
consider the cases of a quantity mandate and a proportional mandate. Each type of
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mandate implies a distinguishing additional constraint on the energy-mix. For the sake of
simplicity, we restrict the analysis to the case where the two types of constraints must be
satisfied ab initio.4
• Quantity mandate:
This first type of RPS requires that some constant minimal amount of renewable
energy y, y > 0, has to be supplied at any point of time, which results in the
following constraint:
y(t)− y ≥ 0 (5)
We assume that y < y˜, so that the mandate is smaller than the solar consumption
rate when oil is exhausted.
• Proportional mandate:
The proportional mandate requires that some constant minimal proportion σ, σ ∈
(0, 1), of the energy services have to be supplied by the solar energy: y(t) ≥ σ[x(t) +
y(t)]. Equivalently, defining θ as the ratio σ/(1−σ) of energy supply from renewable
source to energy supply from fossil source, this constraint may be rewritten as:
y(t)− θx(t) ≥ 0 (6)
Gross surplus
The instantaneous gross surplus derived from the instantaneous energy consumption rate
q(t) is given by some function u(q) satisfying the following standard assumptions. Function
u(.), u : R+ → R+ is of class C2, strictly increasing, strictly concave and verifies the Inada
conditions: limq↓0 u′(q) = +∞ and limq↑+∞ u′(q) = 0. We denote by p(q) = u′(q) the
marginal gross surplus function, that is the energy consumer price, and by qd(p) = p−1(p)
its inverse, that is the direct demand function.
We also assume that the solar marginal cost cy is high enough so that solar energy
is not competitive without any specific promoting policy during any phase at the ceiling.
Denoting by p¯ the energy consumer price at the ceiling when energy services are only
supplied by oil, that is p¯ = u′(x¯), then: p¯ < cy.
In the last section, we will restrict the above general framework to the case of an inelastic
demand function over the price range within which the energy price must evolve along any
4More detailed scenarios in which some targeting is introduced by assuming that the RPS constraint
must satisfied at some later date can also be derived. They are available upon request.
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optimal path. The lowest and highest benchmarks of this price will be determined by the
supply side of the model. This simplification will allow to provide a comparison of the two
types of mandates without changing the main analytical properties of the optimal paths.
Social discount rate and program of the social planner
We assume that the instantaneous social discount rate, denoted by ρ, is constant and
strictly positive, ρ > 0. The program of the social planner consists in determining the
trajectories of x(t) and y(t) that maximize the sum of the discounted net surplus:
max
{x(t),y(t)}
∫ ∞
0
{u [x(t) + y(t)]− cxx(t)− cyy(t)} e−ρtdt
subject to (1)-(4) and, alternatively, to (5) or (6).
Let us denote by λX the costate variable of the state variable X, by λZ minus the
costate variable of Z, by η the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ceiling constraint
on Z, by ν the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint on the solar energy
(quantity or proportional mandate) and by γ's the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the non-negativity constraints on the command variables.
3 Optimal solution under the quantity mandate
3.1 Optimal conditions
Under the nominal quantity mandate, resulting in constraint (5) on the solar energy use,
the current valued Lagrangian Lqm of the optimal program writes as:
Lqm(t) = u[x(t) + y(t)]− cxx(t)− cyy(t)− λX(t)x(t)− λZ(t)[ζx(t)− αZ(t)]
+η(t)[Z¯ − Z(t)] + ν(t)[y(t)− y] + γx(t)x(t)
The first-order conditions relative to the command and to the state variables are:
∂Lqm
∂x
= 0 ⇒ u′[x(t) + y(t)] = cx + λX(t) + ζλZ(t)− γx(t) (7)
∂Lqm
∂y
= 0 ⇒ u′[x(t) + y(t)] = cy − ν(t) (8)
λ˙X = ρλX − ∂L
qm
∂X
⇒ λ˙X(t) = ρλX(t) (9)
λ˙Z = ρλZ +
∂Lqm
∂Z
⇒ λ˙Z(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t)− η(t) (10)
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The associated complementary slackness conditions are:
γx(t) ≥ 0, x(t) ≥ 0 and γx(t)x(t) = 0 (11)
ν(t) ≥ 0, y(t)− y ≥ 0 and ν(t)[y(t)− y] = 0 (12)
η(t) ≥ 0, Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 and η(t)[Z¯ − Z(t)] ≥ 0 (13)
Last, the transversality conditions write as:
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλX(t)X(t) = 0 (14)
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλZ(t)Z(t) = 0 (15)
Due to the number of inequality constraints, all captured by the complementary slack-
ness conditions (11)-(13), the resulting number of possibilities to be analyzed is quite large.
The following preliminary remarks help to eliminate many of them and to directly draw
the optimal solution.5
Remark 1
The shadow marginal value λX(t) of the stock of oil, or mining rent, must grow at the
social rate of discount ρ. From (9), we get: λX(t) = λX0e
ρt, with λX0 = λX(0). Thus
the transversality condition (14) reduces to λX0 limt↑∞X(t) = 0. If oil has some positive
initial value, λX0 > 0, then it must be exhausted along the optimal path.
Remark 2
Concerning the shadow marginal cost of the atmospheric carbon stock λZ(t), note that, as
long as the atmospheric carbon cap is not attained yet, we must have η(t) = 0 from (13)
and then (10) reduces to λ˙Z(t) = (ρ + α)λZ(t). Once the ceiling is definitively left, this
shadow cost is nil since the economy is no more facing any stabilization constraint. Thus,
denoting respectively by tZ and t¯Z the date at which the ceiling constraint is beginning to
be active and the latest date at which Z(t) = Z¯, we may have:
t < tZ ⇒ λZ(t) = λZ0e(ρ+α)t, λZ0 = λZ(0)
t ≥ t¯Z ⇒ λZ(t) = 0
5The multiplicity of solutions is a recurrent problem in this strand of literature already pointed out by
Tahvonen (1997).
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Remark 3
The full marginal cost of oil, as given by the right-hand-side of (7), includes the delivery
cost cx, the resource rent λX(t) and the environmental shadow cost ζλZ(t) in order to
enforce the ceiling constraint. The right-hand-side of (8) gives the full marginal cost of
solar energy, which writes as the delivery cost cy diminished by a "grant" ν(t) to enforce the
constraint on the energy-mix. From (7) and (8), as long as the two primary energy sources
are simultaneously used and since they are perfect substitutes, these two cost expressions
must be equal to the marginal gross surplus of consuming energy: cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ(t) =
cy − ν(t) = u′[x(t) + y(t)].
During a phase of simultaneous oil and solar consumption before the ceiling is attained,
since both λX(t) and λZ(t) are increasing (see remarks 1 and 2), we must have ν(t) > 0 so
that y(t) = y. The same conclusion can be drawn for a simultaneous use of both types of
energy after the ceiling is definitively left since λZ(t) is nil and λX(t) is still growing over
time. Finally, considering the case of a simultaneous use of oil and solar energy during a
phase at the ceiling, we must have: u′(x¯+ y(t)) = cy − ν(t). If y(t) > y, then ν(t) = 0 and
we would get u′(x¯+y(t)) = cy, which is clearly not possible since u′(x¯+y(t)) < u′(x¯) < cy
by assumption. We conclude that, as long as oil is not exhausted yet, the supplying flow
of solar energy must be equal to the quantity mandate y.
Remark 4
Since oil is cheaper than solar, minimizing the sum of discounted cost flows implies that
this energy may be used as much as possible. As a result, the energy-mix consumption
policy consists in two regimes: i) a first period [0, t¯x) during which both primary energy
sources are simultaneously used, the amount of solar energy being fixed to y and the fossil
resource being exhausted at time t¯x and ii) a second period [t¯x,∞) during which the energy
consumption is only supplied by the solar energy flow y(t) = y˜ = qd(cy) > y.
The different phases characterizing the optimal trajectory thus differ depending on
whether the ceiling constraint is binding or not and depending on whether the two primary
energies are simultaneously used or not. We get four successive phases, separated by dates
tZ , t¯Z , and t¯x, with tZ < t¯Z ≤ t¯x.
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3.2 Description of a typical optimal path
The solution is similar to the optimal path derived in Chakravorty et al. (2006) for a
constant structure of costs and a stationary demand, except that the solar energy use is
now constrained by the RPS policy to be at least equal to y. This implies that an incentive
subsidy ν(t) on the solar energy use must be enforced as long as the full marginal cost of
the energy-mix remains lower than the trigger price cy, that is as long as solar energy is
not competitive yet. This subsidy is optimally set such that the respective full marginal
costs of using each type of primary resource are equal. The resulting optimal solution is
a four-phase path as illustrated in figure 1 in the case where the initial oil endowment is
large enough to trigger the binding of the ceiling constraint. The entire characterization of
this solution depends upon the five variables λX0, λZ0, tZ , t¯Z and t¯x whose determination
is detailed in Appendix A.1.
[Figure 1 here]
The starting phase, for t ∈ [0, tZ), takes place before the atmospheric carbon stabi-
lization cap is reached. During this phase, both energy sources are simultaneously used
and the energy consumer price is equal to the full marginal cost of using oil: p(t) =
cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t. This price is growing over time at a rate which is larger than
the social discount rate ρ. Since solar energy consumption is constant and equals to y, oil
consumption writes as the remaining part of the energy demand: x(t) = [qd(cx +λX0e
ρt +
ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t)− y]. This phase ends at time tZ , when the energy price equals u′(x¯+ y) or,
equivalently, when the atmospheric carbon stock attains the ceiling level Z¯.
The second phase, for t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z), is a phase during which the atmospheric carbon
stock is constrained by the ceiling: Z(t) = Z¯. Minimizing the energy production cost
means that oil must be used as far as possible: x(t) = x¯. The solar energy consumption
still amounts to y and the energy price is thus constant: p(t) = u′(x¯ + y). This implies
that the environmental cost of carbon emissions, ζλZ(t) = u
′(x¯ + y) − cx − λX0eρt, is
decreasing: ζλ˙Z(t) = −ρλX0eρt < 0. The phase ends at time t¯Z when this cost is nil and
when, simultaneously, the atmospheric carbon stock starts to fall down below Z¯.
The third phase, for t ∈ [t¯Z , t¯x), is a phase during which the environmental constraint
is not active anymore and the fossil resource extraction runs until exhaustion. The energy
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consumer price is p(t) = cx+λX0e
ρt and the energy-mix consists of x(t) = [qd(cx+λX0e
ρt)−
y] units of oil and y(t) = y units of solar. The phase ends at time t¯x, when the energy
price reaches cy. At this point of time, the fossil resource must be exhausted and the
solar energy consumption must be equal to qd(cy) = y˜. Consequently, the oil consumption
trajectory makes a downward jump from (y˜−y) to 0 and the solar consumption trajectory,
an upward jump from y to y˜. These discontinuities occur because of the constant structure
of costs and RPS which is assumed in the model.
The last phase, for t ∈ [t¯x,∞), is a pure solar energy consumption regime with a con-
stant energy price cy and a corresponding energy consumption y˜. Since solar is becoming
competitive, no specific subsidy is required anymore.
3.3 The optimal policy-mix
As discussed in the previous subsection, a second level of distortion, in addition to the
environmental externality, is introduced by the RPS policy which imposes, in the case of a
quantity mandate, a minimal amount of solar energy consumption. The policy-mix induced
by these two constraints, the atmospheric carbon cap and the mandate, is characterized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the nominal quantity mandate, the policy-mix allowing to sustain
the optimal path consists of:
1. A unitary subsidy ν(t) on solar energy consumption, whose time pace is given by:
ν(t) =

cy − [cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t] t ∈ [0, tZ)
cy − u′(x¯+ y) t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
cy −
(
cx + λX0e
ρt
)
t ∈ [t¯Z , t¯x)
0 t ∈ [t¯x,∞)
(16)
2. A unitary carbon tax ζλZ(t) on oil consumption, whose time pace is given by:
ζλZ(t) =

ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t t ∈ [0, tZ)
u′(x¯+ y)− (cx + λX0eρt) t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
0 t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(17)
As long as the solar energy is not competitive yet, the unitary subsidy ν(t) to promote
this type of energy, which is given by (16), simply writes as the difference between the
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energy price level cy at which solar becomes competitive and the current energy price, as
shown in figure 1. Since this price is always increasing over time and since cy is constant,
the optimal subsidy rate must be non-increasing. At the end of the third phase, when the
fossil resource is fully exhausted, solar energy becomes competitive even without promoting
policy and the subsidy is nil.
As usual in dynamic climate models in which the environmental damages are captured
by a ceiling constraint on the atmospheric carbon stock, the optimal carbon tax, given by
(17), corresponds to the shadow marginal cost of the carbon stock. Graphically (see figure
1), this tax is measured by the gap between the current energy consumer price path and
the current producer price path p(t) = cx + λX0e
ρt, or, equivalently, the marginal delivery
cost of oil augmented by the resource rent. Its shape is similar to the one obtained in
Chakravorty et al. (2006). As long as the ceiling constraint is not binding, the carbon
tax is increasing at a rate which is larger than ρ in order to take into account the natural
regeneration of the atmosphere at a constant rate α. It is next decreasing during the phase
at the ceiling and finally, it falls to zero once the ceiling is definitively left.
The optimal time profiles of ν(t) and ζλZ(t) are depicted in figure 2.
[Figure 2 here]
4 Optimal solution under the proportional mandate
4.1 Optimal conditions
Under the proportional mandate, constraint (5) on the energy-mix composition must be
replaced by (6) and the current valued Lagrangian of the optimal program is:
Lpm(t) = u[x(t) + y(t)]− cxx(t)− cyy(t)− λX(t)x(t)− λZ(t)[ζx(t)− αZ(t)]
+η(t)[Z¯ − Z(t)] + ν(t)[y(t)− θx(t)] + γx(t)x(t)
The first-order conditions (7) and (8) become, respectively:
u′[x(t) + y(t)] = cx + λX(t) + ζλZ(t) + θν(t)− γx(t) (18)
u′[x(t) + y(t)] = cy − ν(t) (19)
and the complementary slackness condition (12) is replaced by:
ν(t) ≥ 0, y(t)− θx(t) ≥ 0 and ν(t)[y(t)− θx(t)] = 0 (20)
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The other conditions remain unchanged, as well as remarks 1 and 2.
As compared with the quantity mandate case, the main change induced by the propor-
tional mandate is that the constraint on the energy-mix now also relies on oil consumption.
Remark 3 is thus modified in the following terms: i) The full marginal cost of oil, as given
by the right-hand-side of (18), includes an additional "penalty" component θν(t) to pro-
mote solar energy, in addition to the other usual terms. ii) This penalty writes as the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the RPS constraint, multiplied by the relative weight
θ of solar energy in the energy-mix. From (19), the full marginal cost of solar must be
diminished by a unitary subsidy ν(t), as in the quantity mandate case. In other words,
using both types of primary energy, which implies the equality of their full marginal costs,
requires to simultaneously subsidize solar at rate ν(t) as long as this energy source is not
competitive yet, and to tax oil at rate θν(t), irrespective of the usual carbon tax required
to enforce the constraint on the atmospheric carbon accumulation.
Next, it can be shown that the RPS constraint (6) must be binding until oil ex-
haustion. The proof calls for the same arguments as in the quantity mandate case.
Hence, as long as the two primary energy resources are simultaneously used, solar en-
ergy must be proportional to oil, y(t) = θx(t), and, from (18) and (19), we must have
ν(t) = (1− σ) {cy − [cx + λX(t) + ζλZ(t)]}.
Finally, note that, as in Lapan and Moschini (2011), the above tax-subsidy scheme is
revenue-neutral at each point of time. By construction, for any t, the tax burden θν(t)x(t)
must balance the amount of subsidy ν(t)y(t) since y(t) = θx(t). However, this does not
mean that tax and subsidy rates coincide. Actually they are equal if and only if θ = 1 or,
equivalently, if σ = 50%.
4.2 Description of a typical optimal path
A first phase A typical optimal path is a four-phase path as illustrated in figure 3 in the
case where the reserves of oil are sufficiently large to guarantee that the atmospheric carbon
cap is attained. The details of its entire characterization are provided in Appendix A.2.
[Figure 3 here]
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During the first phase, for t ∈ [0, tZ), the ceiling constraint is not binding yet and
the two primary energy sources are simultaneously used. The energy price p(t) writes as
the sum of two terms. The first one is the marginal cost σcy of σ% of the energy-mix
supplied by solar and the second one, the marginal cost (1− σ)[cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t]
of (1−σ)% of the energy-mix supplied by oil. Given this price p(t), the energy-mix content
consists of σqd(p(t)) units of solar energy and (1−σ)qd(p(t)) units of oil. Since the energy
price is growing over time, the total energy consumption must be declining, meaning that
oil and solar energy are both decreasing during this phase. A declining oil extraction
path is a standard result in the Hotelling literature, when a decreasing renewable resource
consumption is less usual. It is in fact a direct implication of the specific RPS which is
under consideration here and which links proportionally the consumption of the two types
of primary energy sources (insérer ici détails arbitrage).
The second phase, for t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z), is a phase at the ceiling during which the energy
price is constant: p(t) = u′(x¯/(1− σ)). Oil and solar consumptions are then also constant
and amount, respectively, to x¯ and θx¯.
During the third phase, for t ∈ [t¯Z , t¯x), the ceiling constraint is not active anymore
and the fossil resource must be fully exhausted at the end of the phase. The energy price
is p(t) = σcy + (1 − σ)[cx + λX0eρt]. As in the first phase, this price reads as the sum of
the marginal cost σcy of σ% of the energy-mix supplied by solar and the marginal cost
(1−σ)(cx+λX0eρt) of (1−σ)% of the energy-mix supplied by oil. The energy-mix consists
of (1−σ)qd(p(t)) units of oil and σqd(p(t)) units of solar and these consumption trajectories
are both decreasing through time.
Last, the fourth phase, for t ∈ [t¯x,∞), is the same type of pure solar energy consumption
regime as described in the quantity mandate case.
4.3 The optimal policy-mix
The policy-mix required to implement the optimal path as described above is characterized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the proportional mandate, the policy-mix allowing to sustain the
optimal path consists of:
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1. A subsidy rate ν(t) on solar energy consumption:
ν(t) =

(1− σ){cy − [cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t]} t ∈ [0, tZ)
cy − u′
(
x¯
1−σ
)
t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
(1− σ) [cy − (cx + λX0eρt)] t ∈ [t¯Z , t¯x)
0 t ∈ [t¯x,∞)
(21)
2. A global tax rate τ(t) on fossil energy use:
τ(t) =

σ
[
cy − (cx + λX0eρt)
]
+ (1− σ)ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t t ∈ [0, tZ)
u′
(
x¯
1−σ
)
− (cx + λX0eρt) t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
σ
[
cy − (cx + λX0eρt)
]
t ∈ [t¯Z , t¯x)
0 t ∈ [t¯x,∞)
(22)
As in the quantity mandate case, the unitary solar subsidy ν(t), as given by (21), can
be graphically measured by the gap between cy and the current energy price level p(t) (see
Figure 3). Its trajectory exhibits the same time pace as the one depicted by figure 2.
The fossil energy tax τ(t) expressed in (22) writes as the sum of two tax rates. The
first one is the usual carbon tax ζλZ(t) whose time profile is given by:
ζλZ(t) =

ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t t ∈ [0, tZ)
1
(1−σ)
[
u′
(
x¯
1−σ
)
− σcy − (1− σ)(cx + λX0eρt)
]
t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
0 t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(23)
Its shape is similar to the one obtained in the quantity mandate case and illustrated in
figure 2. The second component is the additional penalty θν(t) on oil consumption required
to promote solar energy. The resulting global tax is then τ(t) = ζλZ(t) + θν(t). It can
be graphically identified in figure 3 as the gap between the current energy consumer price
p(t) and the oil producer price cx + λX0e
ρt.
From (22), the fossil energy tax formally writes as a linear combination of an increasing
term, ζλZ(t) and a decreasing one, ν(t). Without any ambiguity, it is decreasing through
time once the ceiling has been reached, i.e. for t ≥ tZ , since ζλZ(t) and ν(t) are both
decreasing during this time interval. However, the dynamics of τ(t) is not clearly deter-
mined for t ∈ [0, tZ) and it depends upon the relative magnitude of variation of its two
components. During this interval of time, the differentiation with respect to time of (22)
yields τ˙(t) = −ρσλX0eρt + (ρ + α)(1 − σ)ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t. Consequently, the following cases
have to be considered.
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Proposition 3 The dynamics of the fossil energy tax obeys to the following rule:
1. If θρλX0 ≤ (ρ + α)ζλZ0, the growth effect of the carbon tax overrides the decline of
the penalty rate during the first phase. The tax is then first increasing for t ∈ [0, tZ),
next declining for t ∈ [tZ ,∞).
2. If θρλX0 > (ρ + α)ζλZ0, then there exists a date t˜, t˜ =
1
α ln
[
θρλX0
(ρ+α)ζλZ0
]
> 0, such
that τ˙(t˜) = 0. Hence:
(a) if t˜ < tZ , the global tax τ(t) is non-monotonously evolving, being first decreasing
for t ∈ [0, t˜), next increasing for t ∈ [t˜, tZ) and finally declining again for
t ∈ [tZ ,∞).
(b) if t˜ ≥ tZ then, for any t, the tax is always decreasing through time.
These possible time profiles of τ(t) are illustrated in figure 4 (ajouter commentaires).
[Figure 4 here]
5 Comparison of the two mandates when the demand func-
tion is inelastic
In this section, we assume that the energy demand is inelastic within the price range
[cx, cy], i.e. the price range within which the energy price must evolve along any optimal
trajectory. This restriction will allow us to develop a comparative analysis of the quantity
and proportional mandates. Moreover, as it will be shown, this assumption does not change
the analytical properties of the optimal paths. We denote by q¯ the energy flow having to
be delivered at any point of time within this price range in order to satisfy the demand.
Given that the energy production is fixed, the social planner program may be reduced to
a simple cost-minimization problem:
min
{x(t),y(t)}
∫ ∞
0
[cxx(t) + cyy(t)] e
−ρtdt
subject to constraints (1)-(4), alternatively to (5) or (6) and to:
x(t) + y(t) ≥ q¯ (24)
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We denote by γq the Lagrange multiplier associated with (24) and by V the optimal value
of the social planner program, that is the discounted sum of energy consumption costs.
We keep the same notations for the other costate variables.
5.1 The quantity mandate case
Under the quantity mandate and under the inelastic demand assumption, the first-order
conditions (7) and (8) become, respectively:
γq(t) = cx + λX(t) + ζλZ(t)− γx(t) (25)
γq(t) = cy − ν(t) (26)
together with the following complementary slackness condition:
γq(t) ≥ 0, x(t) + y(t)− q¯ ≥ 0 and γq(t)[x(t) + y(t)− q¯] = 0 (27)
The first-order conditions relative to the state variables, the other complementary slackness
conditions and the transversality conditions are those of section 3. In (25) and (26), the
Lagrange multiplier γq(t) plays the role of the energy consumer price, the pendant of u
′ in
the elastic demand case. The interpretation of all the others multipliers does not change.
In order to focus directly on the most relevant case, we assume that y+ x¯ < q¯, implying
both x¯ < q¯ and y < q¯. This assumption guarantees that oil has to be continuously used
until exhaustion and that the carbon stabilization cap Z¯ is reached in finite time. Since
the objective of the social planner is to minimize costs, it can be easily shown that the
inequality constraint (24) must be always binding so that the energy-mix x(t) + y(t) must
supply the totality q¯ of the demand at any point of time.
As compared with the elastic demand case, the date at which the ceiling constraint
becomes no more active coincides with the date at which the fossil resource is exhausted,
t¯Z = t¯x, thus reducing to three the number of phases of the optimal path. The expression
of the energy price is simplified in accordance and we get p(t) = cx +λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
during the first phase before the ceiling, i.e. for t ∈ [0, tZ), and p(t) = cy during the two
next phases, i.e. for t = tZ onwards. Since the total energy to be supplied is constant,
the composition of the energy-mix is also constant within each of these three phases. The
oil consumption is discontinuously decreasing, making a downward jump from (q¯ − y¯) to
x¯ between the first and the second phase, and a downward jump from x¯ to 0 between the
second and the third phase. Conversely, the solar energy consumption first jumps from y
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up to (q¯ − x¯) and next, from (q¯ − x¯) up to q¯. A typical optimal path is depicted by figure
5.
[Figure 5 here]
As in the elastic demand case, the policy-mix allowing to sustain this optimal path
is composed by a carbon tax ζλZ(t) on the oil consumption and a subsidy ν(t) on solar
energy use, as given by:
ζλZ(t) =

ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t t ∈ [0, tZ)
cy −
(
cx + λX0e
ρt
)
t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
0 t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(28)
ν(t) =
{
cy −
[
cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
]
t ∈ [0, tZ)
0 t ∈ [tZ ,∞)
(29)
The four variables tZ , t¯Z , λX0 and λZ0 are the solutions of a four-equation system as
detailed in Appendix A.1. The discounted sum of total energy expenditures, that is the
optimal value Φ of the objective function, is:
V =
1
ρ
[
cx(q¯ − y) + cyy + (cy − cx)(q¯ − x¯− y)e−ρtZ + (cy − cx)x¯e−ρt¯Z
]
(30)
Finally, the effect of a change in the mandate level y on the optimal path is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An increase (respectively a decrease) in y results in an increase (resp. a
decrease) in tZ , t¯Z and V , and a decrease (resp. an increase) in (t¯Z − tZ), λX0 and λZ0.
Proof: see Appendix A.3. 
Imposing a larger minimal amount of solar in the energy-mix reduces the consumption
of oil during the first phase before the ceiling since x = q¯ − y with an inelastic demand.
On the one hand, since during the next phase at the ceiling the oil consumption does not
depend on y, this diminution in the first period means that oil is less scarce and that the
date at which the initial reserves are exhausted is postponed. These results are illustrated
in figure 5 by λ′X0 < λX0 and t¯
′
Z > t¯Z . On the other hand, the reduction of the oil
consumption during the first phase implies less carbon emissions. Consequently, the initial
shadow cost of the pollution stock is reduced and the date at which the ceiling is reached is
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postponed, as shown in figure 5 by λ′Z0 < λZ0 and t
′
Z > tZ . Remark that, in this case, the
length [t¯Z−tZ ] of the phase at the ceiling is shortened. Since both λX0 and λZ0 decline, the
energy price trajectory shifts downward during the first phase6. Since the marginal cost
cy of solar, that is the price at which this energy becomes competitive, does not depend
on the mandate level, the unitary solar subsidy must increase and, simultaneously, the
carbon tax is diminished. Finally, the discounted overall impact of an increase in y can
be assessed by looking at the effect on V . We obtain that an increase in the imposed
amount of solar tends to increase the discounted sum of total cost of using the two kinds of
resource, thus implying a decrease in the social welfare. Again, with an inelastic demand
function, increasing the solar consumption means decreasing by an equivalent amount the
oil consumption. Due to the difference in the marginal costs of each resource, this increases
the discounted sum V of total costs.
5.2 Proportional mandate
With a proportional mandate, the development of the social planner problem in the in-
elastic case obeys to the same rules as with a quantity mandate, except that the con-
straint on the energy-mix (5) is replaced by (6). Deriving the optimal solution requires
to consider the following additional assumption: x¯ < (1 − σ)q¯. We thus obtain again
a three-phase optimal path. The only difference with the quantity mandate case lies in
the energy price trajectory which is followed during the first phase. As in the general
elastic demand case, this price is a linear combination between the full marginal cost of
the solar energy and the full marginal cost of oil, respectively weighed by σ and (1 − σ):
p(t) = σcy + (1 − σ)
[
cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
]
. From t = tZ onwards, this price is
constant and equal to the marginal cost of the solar energy: p(t) = cy. Consequently,
the consumption of each primary energy resource is also constant. Oil consumption first
amounts to (1− σ)q¯ during the first phase before the ceiling, next to x¯ during the second
phase at the ceiling and finally to 0 when the ceiling is definitively left. The solar consump-
tion is this complement part that allows for satisfying the demand function: y(t) = q¯−x(t).
The corresponding environmental policy tools mixes a subsidy ν(t) on the solar energy
6This result is obtained through the assumptions of perfect substitution between the two primary energy
sources, and with constant marginal delivery cost. In a static model without any environmental constraint,
but with elastic energy supply curves, Fischer (2010) shows that a RPS lowers energy prices depending
on the elasticity of energy supply from renewable energy sources relative to nonrenewable ones and the
effective stringency of the RPS target.
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use and a tax τ(t) on oil consumption, which includes the tax ζλZ(t) on carbon emissions
and the penalty θν(t):
ν(t) =
{
(1− σ){cy − [cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t]} t ∈ [0, tZ)
0 t ∈ [tZ ,∞)
(31)
τ(t) =

ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t + θν(t) t ∈ [0, tZ)
ζλZ(t) = cy −
(
cx + λX0e
ρt
)
t ∈ [tZ , t¯Z)
0 t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(32)
The dynamic properties of these instruments, as discussed in section 4 in the general case,
are preserved by the inelasticity of the demand function.
Last, the four variables tZ , t¯Z , λX0 and λZ0, are characterized in Appendix A.2, and
the optimal value of the social planner program is:
V =
1
ρ
{
cx(1− σ)q¯ + cyσq¯ + (cy − cx)[(1− σ)q¯ − x¯]e−ρtZ + (cy − cx)x¯e−ρt¯Z
}
(33)
It can easily be shown that the optimal path is modified by a change in σ in the same
terms as in the quantity mandate case. Hence, results of Proposition 3 as well as the
discussion that followed, hold whatever the type of RPS which is implemented.
5.3 Comparison of the two systems
Since the two typical optimal paths described above are parameterized by the level of the
two specific types of mandate, comparing them requires to exogenously select a particular
couple
{
y, σ
}
. We propose to identify the relationship between these two parameters such
that the two corresponding programs have the same objective function values. In what
follows, we index by i, i = {pm, qm}, the type of promoting policy which is considered,
proportional versus quantity mandate. It can be easily shown that, if y = σq¯, i.e. if the
mandate advocated by a quantity RPS policy is set to be equal to the amount of solar
energy resulting from the proportional RPS policy that is σ% of the total energy demand
q¯, then the two sets of variables (46)-(49) and (62)-(65) coincide. From (30) and (33), the
two corresponding programs thus have the same value:
y = σq¯ ⇒

tqmZ = t
pm
Z
t¯qmZ = t¯
pm
Z
λqmX0 = λ
pm
X0
λqmZ0 = λ
pm
Z0
⇒ V qm = V pm
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With an inelastic demand function, since the consumer price of the energy-mix is constant
and equal to cy from tZ onward for each type of mandate system, these two cases contrast
only during the first phase [0, tZ). During this phase, the key distinguishing features
between the two types of policies are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If y = σq¯ so that Φqm = Φpm, then for t ∈ [0, tZ):
1. The price of the energy-mix with a proportional mandate is larger than the price with
a quantity mandate as long as the ceiling is not reached: ppm(t) > pqm(t).
2. The trajectories of the carbon taxes are the same: λpmZ (t) = λ
qm
Z (t).
3. A proportional mandate induces a lower subsidy rate on solar energy than a quantity
mandate: θνpm(t) < νqm(t)
4. A proportional mandate requires a larger global tax rate on oil consumption than a
quantity mandate: τpm(t) > λqmZ (t).
Proof: We have ppm(t) = σcy + (1− σ)[cx + λX0eρt + λZ0e(ρ+α)t] = σcy + (1− σ)pqm(t),
resulting in p˙pm(t) = (1 − σ)p˙qm(t) < p˙qm(t). Since tpmZ = tqmZ , the two price paths reach
the same level cy at the same time. The price p
qm(t) being strictly increasing and growing
faster than the price p(t)pm, this later must be always larger than the former, which gives
the proof of result 1. Result 2 directly comes from the equality between λqmZ0 and λ
pm
Z0 .
Results 3 and 4 are an implication of result 1 by observing that νi(t) = cy − pi(t) and that
τ i(t) = pi(t)− (cx + λX0eρt), for i = {pm, qm}. 
These results are illustrated in figure 6.
[Figure 6 here]
Starting from the benchmark case where y = σq¯, we can use the results of Proposition
3 to investigate the other cases, that is to underline the effects of an unilateral change in
y. Consequently, if y > σq¯, we would have: tqmZ > t
pm
Z , t¯
qm
Z > t¯
pm
Z , λ
qm
X0 < λ
pm
X0, λ
qm
Z0 < λ
pm
Z0
and Φqm > Φpmid (and the opposite if y < σq¯). Hence, increasing the quantity mandate y
with respect to the proportional objective σ mainly reinforces the results of Proposition
4. It lowers the price of the energy-mix under the quantity mandate by increasing the
solar subsidy and reducing the carbon tax, thus enlarging the gap with the respective pm
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values. In the opposite case, when the quantity mandate is reduced as compared with the
proportional policy, the qm energy price is increased and becomes larger than the pm price,
at least at the end of the phase. However, since such parameter changes will also affect
the timing of each phase, it is difficult to rank the policy instruments as it was previously
done.
6 Conclusion
We have extended the Chakravorty et al. (2006) model to compare two kinds of RPS that
only differ in their definition basis. The minimal level of renewable energy supply to be
achieved was defined either as a ratio of the energy-mix (proportional mandate) or as an
independent quantitative target (quantity mandate). We found the following results. i)
Whatever the type of mandate, the optimal subsidy on renewable energy is declining over
time. ii) Under a proportional mandate, an additional penalty on fossil energy, proportional
to the subsidy, must be added to the carbon tax. The resulting global tax on fossil fuel can
exhibit unusual non-monotonous time paces as long as the atmospheric carbon cap is not
reached. iii) Whatever the type of the mandate, a RPS lowers the energy price, reduces the
social objective function and delays the date at which the carbon cap constraint is binding.
iv) If the two types of mandates are such that they yield the same social objective value
then, with an inelastic energy demand function and as long as the carbon cap is not reached:
a quantity mandate implies a lower energy price, a larger subsidy on renewable energy and
a smaller fossil fuel tax (including the carbon tax) than a proportional mandate.
We have not discussed about the normative properties of the carbon cap and the RPS.
We simply assumed that they come from some recommendations by an independent expert
and that they must be taken as given by the agents. However, one can ask the question
of the relative efficiency of these two climate policy instruments (see Fischer and Preonas,
2010). An obvious extension of this paper would be to derive the second-best optimal
mandate time pace in the case where a carbon cap policy is not achievable. We would
thus be able to compare it with the optimal solution under a carbon cap constraint and to
conclude about its efficiency both in terms of social welfare and environmental performance.
We let these developments for future works.
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Appendix
A.1 Full characterization of the optimal solution: The case of a quantity
mandate
The optimal solution is parameterized by λX0, λZ0, tZ , t¯Z and t¯x. With a general elastic
demand function, these five variables are given as the solution of the following system:∫ tZ
0
{
qd
[
cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
]
− y
}
dt+ (t¯Z − tZ)x¯
+
∫ t¯x
t¯Z
[
qd
(
cx + λX0e
ρt
)− y] dt = X0 (34)
Z0 + ζ
∫ tZ
0
{
qd
[
cx + λX0e
ρt + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
]
− y
}
eαtdt = Z¯eαtZ (35)
cx + λX0e
ρtZ + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)tZ = u′(x¯+ y) (36)
cx + λX0e
ρt¯Z = u′(x¯+ y) (37)
cx + λX0e
ρt¯x = cy (38)
Equations (34) and (35) means, respectively, that the non-renewable resource stock X0
must be exhausted at time t¯x and that the atmospheric carbon stock must reach the
ceiling at time tZ , i.e. Z(tZ) = Z¯. Equations (36)-(38) insure continuity of the energy
price path, and then of the energy consumption path, at time tZ , t¯Z and t¯x respectively.
From (37) and (38), we can deduce the following optimal dates:
t¯Z =
1
ρ
ln
(
u′(x¯+ y)− cx
λX0
)
(39)
t¯x =
1
ρ
ln
(
cy − cx
λX0
)
(40)
Such a solution exists if λX0 < p¯ − cx and if λX0 < cy − cx. Since cy is assumed to be
larger than u′(x¯), with u′(x¯) > u′(x¯ + y), the existence condition of the optimal solution
writes:
λX0 < u
′(x¯+ y)− cx < cy − cx (41)
With an inelastic demand function, t¯Z = t¯x and the above system reduces to the
following four-equation system:
(q¯ − y)tZ + x¯(t¯Z − tZ) = X0 (42)
Z0 +
ζ(q¯ − y)
α
(
eαtZ − 1) = Z¯eαtZ (43)
cx + λX0e
ρtZ + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)tZ = cy (44)
cx + λX0e
ρt¯Z = cy (45)
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Contrary to the general elastic demand case, the restriction to an inelastic demand
function allows us to solve this system:
tZ =
1
α
ln
[
ζ(q¯ − y)− αZ0
ζ(q¯ − y)− αZ¯
]
(46)
t¯Z =
ζX0 − [ζ(q¯ − y)− αZ¯]tZ
αZ¯
(47)
λX0 = (cy − cx)e−ρt¯Z (48)
λZ0 =
(cy − cx)
ζ
(
e−ρtZ − e−ρt¯Z
)
e−αtZ (49)
A.2 Full characterization of the optimal solution: The case of a propor-
tional mandate
The five variables λX0, λZ0, tZ , t¯Z and t¯x are given as the solution of the following five
equations system:
(1− σ)
∫ tZ
0
qd
{
σcy + (1− σ)[cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t]
}
dt
+(t¯Z − tZ)x¯+ (1− σ)
∫ t¯x
t¯Z
qd[σcy + (1− σ)(cx + λX0eρt)]dt = X0 (50)
ζ(1− σ)
∫ tZ
0
qd
{
σcy + (1− σ)[cx + λX0eρt + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)t]
}
eαtdt
+Z0 = Z¯eαtZ (51)
σcy + (1− σ)[cx + λX0eρtZ + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)tZ ] = u′
(
x¯
1− σ
)
(52)
σcy + (1− σ)
(
cx + λX0e
ρt¯Z
)
= u′
(
x¯
1− σ
)
(53)
cx + λX0e
ρt¯x = cy (54)
from which we deduce the following optimal dates:
t¯Z =
1
ρ
ln
u′
(
x¯
1−σ
)
− σcy − (1− σ)cx
(1− σ)λX0
 (55)
t¯x =
1
ρ
ln
[
cy − cx
λX0
]
(56)
Those expressions implicitly require the following existence condition:
λX0 <
u′
(
x¯
1−σ
)
− σcy − (1− σ)cx
1− σ < cy − cx (57)
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With an inelastic demand function, the above system becomes:
(1− σ)q¯tZ + x¯(t¯Z − tZ) = X0 (58)
ζ(1− σ)q¯
α
(
eαtZ − 1)+ Z0 = Z¯eαtZ (59)
σcy + (1− σ)[cx + λX0eρtZ + ζλZ0e(ρ+α)tZ ] = cy (60)
cx + λX0e
ρt¯Z = cy (61)
and its solution is given by:
tZ =
1
α
ln
[
ζ(1− σ)q¯ − αZ0
ζ(1− σ)q¯ − αZ¯
]
(62)
t¯Z =
ζX0 − [ζ(1− σ)q¯ − αZ¯]tZ
αZ¯
(63)
λX0 = (cy − cx)e−ρt¯Z (64)
λZ0 =
(cy − cx)
ζ
(
e−ρtZ − e−ρt¯Z
)
e−αtZ (65)
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A.3 Proof of proposition 3
The proof is done from the partial derivative of the system (42)-(45) with respect to y.
• First, from (43), we have:
ζ(q¯− y)eαtZ ∂tZ
∂y
− ζ
α
(eαtZ − 1) = αZ¯eαtZ ∂tZ
∂y
⇒ ∂tZ
∂y
=
(1− e−αtZ )
α(q¯ − y − x¯) > 0 (66)
• Second, the partial derivative of (42) is:
−tZ + (q¯ − y − x¯)
∂tZ
∂y
+ x¯
∂t¯Z
∂y
= 0
Using (66), it comes:
x¯
∂t¯Z
∂y
= tZ −
(1− e−αtZ )
α
(67)
Since the function f(z) = z − (1 − e−αz)/α is such that f(0) = 0 and f ′(z) =
1− e−αz > 0 for any z > 0, then f(z) > 0 implying ∂t¯Z/∂y > 0.
• Third, from (66) and (67), we have:
∂(t¯Z − tZ)
∂y
=
1
x¯
[
tZ −
(
q¯ − y
q¯ − y − x¯
)
(1− e−αtZ )
α
]
<
1
x¯
[
tZ −
(
q¯ − y − αZ0/ζ
q¯ − y − x¯
)
(1− e−αtZ )
α
]
(68)
Let us define β1 = q¯ − y − x¯ and β2 = q¯ − y − αZ0/ζ, with β2 > β1 since Z0 < Z¯ =
ζx¯/α. Then, from (46), tZ can be rewritten as ln(β2/β1)/α and, after simplification,
inequality (68) becomes:
∂(t¯Z − tZ)
∂y
<
1
αx¯
[
ln
β2
β1
−
(
β2
β1
)
+ 1
]
(69)
Defining the function g(z) = ln(z) − z + 1, with z > 1, we have limz↓1 g(z) = 0,
limz↑+∞ g(z) = −∞, g′(z) = (1 − z)/z < 0 and then g(z) < 0 for any z > 1. Then
the right-hand-side of equation (69) is negative and ∂(t¯Z − tZ)/∂y is also proved to
be negative.
• Next, from (45), we obtain:
∂λX0
∂y
= −ρλX0∂t¯Z
∂y
< 0 (70)
• The partial derivative of (44) yields:
ζeαtZ
∂λZ0
∂y
= −∂λX0
∂y
− [ρλX0 + (ρ+ α)ζλZ0eαtZ ] ∂tZ
∂y
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Using (66), (67) and (70), and rearranging some terms, this last expression can be
rewritten as:
αeαtZ
∂λZ0
∂y
=
(ρ+ α)λZ0
(
1− eαtZ)
(q¯ − x¯− y) +
ρλX0
Z¯
[
tZ −
(
q¯ − y
q¯ − y − x¯
)
(1− e−αtZ )
α
]
(71)
The first term of the right-hand-side of (71) is clearly negative, and the second term
is also negative due to result (69). Hence, ∂λZ0/∂y < 0.
• Last, the partial derivative of (30) with respect to y is:
∂Φ
∂y
=
(cy − cx)
ρ
[
1− e−ρtZ − ρ(q¯ − y − x¯)e−ρtZ ∂tZ
∂y
− ρx¯e−ρt¯Z ∂t¯Z
∂y
]
Using (66) and (67), it comes:
∂Φ
∂y
=
(cy − cx)
ρ
{
1− e−ρtZ − ρe−ρtZ (1− e
−αtZ )
α
− ρe−ρt¯Z
[
tZ −
(1− e−αtZ )
α
]}
Since t¯Z > tZ , we have −e−ρt¯Z > −e−ρtZ and then:
∂Φ
∂y
>
(cy − cx)
ρ
{
1− e−ρtZ − ρe−ρtZ (1− e
−αtZ )
α
− ρe−ρtZ
[
tZ −
(1− e−αtZ )
α
]}
⇔ ∂Φ
∂y
>
(cy − cx)
ρ
e−ρtZ
(
eρtZ − 1− ρtZ
)
(72)
Since the function h(z) = eρz − ρz − 1 defined for z > 0 is such that h(0) = 0 and
h′(z) = ρ(eρz − 1) > 0, then h(z) > 0 for any z > 0 and ∂Φ/∂y > 0.
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Figure 1: Time profiles of the energy price and consumption. The case of a quantity
mandate
31
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
t
0
0
 tus
 tZ
0Z
Zt Zt
ZtZt xt
 yxucy  '
 00 ZXxy cc  
Figure 2: Time profiles of the carbon tax and the solar subsidy. The case of a quantity
mandate
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mandate
33
t
0
 t
Zt Zt
  00 ZX  
xtt~
  ZZX ttand  ~00 
  ZZX ttand  ~00 
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Figure 5: Time profiles of the energy price and consumption with a quantity mandate.
The inelastic demand case
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